win7 cfos + BT(ut or bc) = 藍底白字 ? - Windows

防毒是小紅傘免費版 ＋ comodo 免費版。
不管是用utorrent 或是 bitcomet，過一段時間一定會有藍天白雲和我say hello.
請問問題究竟是出在那邊？ cfos的問題？ 請高手幫忙，感謝！
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Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.11.0001.404 AMD64
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.


Loading Dump File [C:\Windows\Minidump\011610-27518-01.dmp]
Mini Kernel Dump File: Only registers and stack trace are available

Symbol search path is: SRV*c:\websymbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
Executable search path is:
Windows 7 Kernel Version 7600 MP (2 procs) Free x64
Product: WinNt, suite: TerminalServer SingleUserTS
Built by: 7600.16385.amd64fre.win7_rtm.090713-1255
Machine Name:
Kernel base = 0xfffff800`04c09000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0xfffff800`04e46e50
Debug session time: Sat Jan 16 19:11:22.625 2010 (GMT+8)
System Uptime: 0 days 4:03:01.747
Loading Kernel Symbols
...............................................................
................................................................
....................................
Loading User Symbols
Loading unloaded module list
.......
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Bugcheck Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************

Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information.

BugCheck 7F, {8, 80050031, 6f8, fffff80004c8085f}

Unable to load image inspect.sys, Win32 error 0n2
*** WARNING: Unable to verify timestamp for inspect.sys
*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for inspect.sys
Probably caused by : NETIO.SYS ( NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a )

Followup: MachineOwner
---------

1: kd> !analyze -v
*******************************************************************************
* *
* Bugcheck Analysis *
* *
*******************************************************************************

UNEXPECTED_KERNEL_MODE_TRAP (7f)
This means a trap occurred in kernel mode, and it's a trap of a kind
that the kernel isn't allowed to have/catch (bound trap) or that
is always instant death (double fault). The first number in the
bugcheck params is the number of the trap (8 = double fault, etc)
Consult an Intel x86 family manual to learn more about what these
traps are. Here is a *portion* of those codes:
If kv shows a taskGate
use .tss on the part before the colon, then kv.
Else if kv shows a trapframe
use .trap on that value
Else
.trap on the appropriate frame will show where the trap was taken
(on x86, this will be the ebp that goes with the procedure KiTrap)
Endif
kb will then show the corrected stack.
Arguments:
Arg1: 0000000000000008, EXCEPTION_DOUBLE_FAULT
Arg2: 0000000080050031
Arg3: 00000000000006f8
Arg4: fffff80004c8085f

Debugging Details:
------------------


BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7f_8

CUSTOMER_CRASH_COUNT: 1

DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: VISTA_DRIVER_FAULT

PROCESS_NAME: uTorrent.exe

CURRENT_IRQL: 2

LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from fffff80004c7a469 to fffff80004c7af00

STACK_TEXT:
fffff880`009edc68 fffff800`04c7a469 : 00000000`0000007f 00000000`00000008 00000000`80050031 00000000`000006f8 : nt!KeBugCheckEx
fffff880`009edc70 fffff800`04c78932 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiBugCheckDispatch+0x69
fffff880`009eddb0 fffff800`04c8085f : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiDoubleFaultAbort+0xb2
fffff880`0542af60 fffff800`04c80410 : fffff880`0542b1d0 00000000`00000000 fffff880`0542b1d0 fffff880`0542b1f0 : nt!SepAccessCheck+0x4f
fffff880`0542b090 fffff800`04c43842 : fffffa80`03ecf080 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0645d7c8 : nt!SeAccessCheckWithHint+0x180
fffff880`0542b170 fffff880`01754c5a : fffff880`0542c0d8 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000000 fffff880`0542b9d0 : nt!SeAccessCheckFromState+0x102
fffff880`0542b860 fffff880`0175294f : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`00000000 fffff880`0542c0d8 00000000`00000000 : NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+0x6a
fffff880`0542b8d0 fffff880`017549b5 : fffff880`80000000 fffffa80`03ecf7a4 00010101`011fffff fffff800`00000003 : NETIO!MatchValues+0xef
fffff880`0542b920 fffff880`01754845 : fffffa80`063b97e0 fffffa80`03de36c0 fffff880`0542bb48 fffff880`0542c150 : NETIO!FilterMatch+0x95
fffff880`0542b970 fffff880`01755ccb : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`0542c150 fffff880`0542bb30 : NETIO!IndexListClassify+0x69
fffff880`0542b9f0 fffff880`0183e4d0 : fffff880`0542c150 fffff880`0542be78 fffffa80`04f09fa0 fffffa80`0407d290 : NETIO!KfdClassify+0xa4e
fffff880`0542bd60 fffff880`0183b6a3 : fffffa80`06851620 fffff880`0542cad8 fffff880`0194002c fffff880`0542cc50 : tcpip!WfpAleClassify+0x50
fffff880`0542bda0 fffff880`0183bff8 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`04786a20 00000000`00000002 fffff880`04782025 : tcpip!WfpAlepAuthorizeReceive+0x793
fffff880`0542c3c0 fffff880`0183aad1 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`0000002c 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`04ad0a60 : tcpip!WfpAleAuthorizeReceive+0x3c8
fffff880`0542c6a0 fffff880`0183d6a4 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`0542cb20 fffff880`0542cbd8 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!WfpAleConnectAcceptIndicate+0x281
fffff880`0542c790 fffff880`0187cf2d : fffff880`0542cbe8 fffff880`0165d28a fffffa80`047c9740 fffffa80`0407d290 : tcpip!ProcessALEForTransportPacket+0x664
fffff880`0542ca00 fffff880`0183f080 : fffffa80`06851620 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000002 00000000`00000000 : tcpip!ProcessAleForNonTcpIn+0x1ad
fffff880`0542cb20 fffff880`0186d861 : fffffa80`00000011 fffffa80`06df0002 fffffa80`04816630 00000000`0000247b : tcpip!WfpProcessInTransportStackIndication+0xb10
fffff880`0542ce90 fffff880`0183ff93 : fffffa80`06dfc010 fffffa80`04811d00 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0481a000 : tcpip!InetInspectReceiveDatagram+0x121
fffff880`0542cf30 fffff880`01840345 : fffffa80`06dfc010 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000003 : tcpip!UdpBeginMessageIndication+0x83
fffff880`0542d080 fffff880`0184079d : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`06dfc010 fffffa80`04811d00 fffffa80`0440b782 : tcpip!UdpDeliverDatagrams+0xd5
fffff880`0542d210 fffff880`0185c427 : fffffa80`04811ca0 fffffa80`00000002 fffffa80`04ad0002 00000000`00000002 : tcpip!UdpReceiveDatagrams+0x1ed
fffff880`0542d300 fffff880`0185c499 : fffff880`0542d480 fffff880`0196c9a0 fffff880`0542d490 fffffa80`047df820 : tcpip!IppDeliverListToProtocol+0xf7
fffff880`0542d3c0 fffff880`0185c990 : fffff880`0196c9a0 fffffa80`0407d3c0 00000000`00000011 fffff880`0542d480 : tcpip!IppProcessDeliverList+0x59
fffff880`0542d430 fffff880`0185b821 : 00000000`4a56e67d fffffa80`0481a000 fffff880`0196c9a0 00000000`00000001 : tcpip!IppReceiveHeaderBatch+0x231
fffff880`0542d510 fffff880`0477f377 : fffffa80`03c3d620 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`00000001 : tcpip!IpFlcReceivePackets+0x651
fffff880`0542d710 fffff880`0171a0eb : fffffa80`04a18f02 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`05b4c010 : wanarp!WanNdisReceivePackets+0x317
fffff880`0542d7c0 fffff880`016e4165 : fffffa80`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 : ndis!ndisMIndicateNetBufferListsToOpen+0xdb
fffff880`0542d830 fffff880`01666a24 : fffffa80`053b51a0 fffff880`12bffdf8 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`039fc710 : ndis!ndisMDispatchReceiveNetBufferLists+0x375
fffff880`0542dcb0 fffff880`016669e9 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`0407d3c0 fffff880`0471d2c9 : ndis!ndisMTopReceiveNetBufferLists+0x24
fffff880`0542dcf0 fffff880`01666980 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`0715152e fffff880`071a70a8 fffff880`071a7040 : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`0542dd30 fffff880`0471f5fc : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`0407d290 00000000`00000001 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`0542dd70 fffff880`016669e9 : fffffa80`04e4f4f0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 fffffa80`066818f0 : pacer!PcFilterReceiveNetBufferLists+0x10c
fffff880`0542ddf0 fffff880`01666980 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`03c0da10 fffffa80`0702ebd0 fffff880`0474069a : ndis!ndisFilterIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x29
fffff880`0542de30 fffff880`0473cf19 : fffffa80`0440b720 fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04e456d0 fffffa80`04e4f4f0 : ndis!NdisFIndicateReceiveNetBufferLists+0x50
fffff880`0542de70 fffffa80`0440b720 : fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04e456d0 fffffa80`04e4f4f0 fffffa80`00000000 : inspect+0x1f19
fffff880`0542de78 fffffa80`03c0db40 : fffffa80`04e456d0 fffffa80`04e4f4f0 fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`03c0db40 : 0xfffffa80`0440b720
fffff880`0542de80 fffffa80`04e456d0 : fffffa80`04e4f4f0 fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04f36680 : 0xfffffa80`03c0db40
fffff880`0542de88 fffffa80`04e4f4f0 : fffffa80`00000000 fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04f36680 fffff880`0474509d : 0xfffffa80`04e456d0
fffff880`0542de90 fffffa80`00000000 : fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04f36680 fffff880`0474509d fffffa80`04f36680 : 0xfffffa80`04e4f4f0
fffff880`0542de98 fffffa80`03c0db40 : fffffa80`04f36680 fffff880`0474509d fffffa80`04f36680 fffffa80`03c0db40 : 0xfffffa80`00000000
fffff880`0542dea0 fffffa80`04f36680 : fffff880`0474509d fffffa80`04f36680 fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04e456d0 : 0xfffffa80`03c0db40
fffff880`0542dea8 fffff880`0474509d : fffffa80`04f36680 fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04e456d0 00000000`00000000 : 0xfffffa80`04f36680
fffff880`0542deb0 fffffa80`04f36680 : fffffa80`03c0db40 fffffa80`04e456d0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`068e8c60 : inspect+0xa09d
fffff880`0542deb8 fffffa80`03c0db40 : fffffa80`04e456d0 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`068e8c60 fffff880`047458aa : 0xfffffa80`04f36680
fffff880`0542dec0 fffffa80`04e456d0 : 00000000`00000000 fffffa80`068e8c60 fffff880`047458aa fffffa80`04f36680 : 0xfffffa80`03c0db40
fffff880`0542dec8 00000000`00000000 : fffffa80`068e8c60 fffff880`047458aa fffffa80`04f36680 fffffa80`04e456d0 : 0xfffffa80`04e456d0


STACK_COMMAND: kb

FOLLOWUP_IP:
NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a
fffff880`01754c5a 448b442470 mov r8d,dword ptr [rsp+70h]

SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 6

SYMBOL_NAME: NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a

FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner

MODULE_NAME: NETIO

IMAGE_NAME: NETIO.SYS

DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4a5bc18a

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a

BUCKET_ID: X64_0x7f_8_NETIO!CompareSecurityContexts+6a

Followup: MachineOwner
---------


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